Marquette Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 4 Spring 1963

Article 13

Insanity as a Defense and the Problem of Definition
David A. Suemnick

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
David A. Suemnick, Insanity as a Defense and the Problem of Definition, 46 Marq. L. Rev. 542 (1963).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol46/iss4/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

ing effect will result from a continued strict construction of these
statutes, the courts will have to look to the legislative history of their
enactment, or Congress will have to specifically re-define the criminal
elements of the acts intended to be prohibited.
JOHN L. REITER
Criminal Law: Insanity as a Defense and The Problem of
Definition-The case of State v. Esser' involved an indictment for
first degree murder. The defendant had pleaded not guilty, and not
guilty by reason of insanity. The insanity instructions submitted to
the jury by the trial judge were based on draft four of the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute.2 The jury found Gregory
Esser not guilty because of insanity. Esser was committed to Central
State Hospital pursuant to § 957.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes.3 The
State appealed the decision. Included in the grounds for appeal was
the argument that the definition of insanity used by the trial court
should not be adhered to upon its merits. The State's contention was
that Wisconsin has always followed the M'Naghten definition4 in
criminal cases, and this long tradition should not now be changed. This
case is typical of the many cases that have been arising before the
high courts of several states in an attempt to reach a unanimously
accepted and workable definition of what constitutes legal insanity.
16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W. 2d 567 (1962).
2 M.ODEL PENAL CODE, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1961), p. 4, §4:01:
1

"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
"(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct."
3 WIS. STAT. §957.11(3) (1961) : "If found not guilty because insane or not
guilty because feeble-minded, the defendant shall be committed to the central
state hospital or to an institution designated by the state department of public
welfare, there to be detained until discharged in accordance with law."
4 ". . . And as these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered
together, we have to submit our opinion to be, that the jurors ought to be
told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess
a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction: and that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question
to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the
time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong: . . . If
the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do,
and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, lie is
punishable; and the usual course, therefore, has been to leave the question to
the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know
that he was doing an act that was wrong:" M'Naughten's Case, 10 Clark
and Finnelly's Reports 200, 210-211 (1843).
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When a man has committed an act contrary to the law of the state,
he has committed a crime. Unless he is held not to be criminally responsible, he must suffer the penal consequences imposed for commission of such an act. Experience has shown this to be necessary
for the protection of society. The question of whether or not a man
is legally insane is bound up in the question of his being responsible
for an act he has committed. The. existence of legal insanity negates
criminal responsibility. A jury is called upon to decide whether or
not a man was criminally insane when he committed an act. Therefore the problem of defining legal insanity is essentially one of formulating a standard by which a jury can decide what mental condition
makes a man no longer responsible for his acts in the legal sense.
The ultimate definition of insanity that a particular court arrives
at is influenced by several factors. Among the most basic are what
man's basic nature is thought to be, what school of psychological
thought is followed, and what constitutes a sufficient standard upon
which a jury may base a finding of insanity. From the view-point of
general categorization, different views on the above factors have led
to three basically different tests of insanity in the various jurisdictions.
The test used in the majority of the United States jurisdictions
is the M'Naghten test,5 commonly referred to as the right-wrong test.
Essentially this test means that one is not criminally responsible for
his act if he does not appreciate the nature and quality bf his act or
is incapable of knowing right from wrong. This test of insanity has
been followed strictly by the Wisconsin court since the case of Oborn
v. State decided in 1910.
The term insanity as used in the special plea in a criminal
case, means such abnormal mental condition, from any cause,
as to render the accused at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act, incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong and so unconscious at the time of the nature of the act
which he is committing, and that the commission of it will
subject him to punishment.'
This definition of insanity was clarified by the court in Jessner v. State
where, in referring to Oborn v. State, they said: "This definition
makes the only test that of whether the accused at the time of the
commission of the acts was conscious that the act was one which he
9
ought not do."' 7 In State v. Si tecek and in State v. $ohnson the court
stated that Oborn was the law on insanity in Wisconsin.
Like most legal standard' the right-wrong test of theM'Naghten
5Ibid.
6 143 Wis. 249, 268, 126 N.W. 737, 745 (1910).
7 202 Wis. 184, 197, 231 N.W. 634, 272 (1910).
8243 Wis. 439, 10 N.W. 2d 161 (1943).
9233 Wis. 668, 290 N.W. 159 (1940).
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case is not perfect, and thus has been subject to criticism. The criticisms basically follow two lines, and it is out of these criticisms that
the other two legal definitions of insanity grow.
The first criticism is that in stating the test in terms of right and
wrong the M'Naghten test stresses the cognitive aspect of man's
nature at the expense of the volitional aspect. Generally, the idea here
is that a man can know an act is wrong and still do it, due to a socalled uncontrollable urge. This criticism has led to the irresistable
impulse modification of the M'Naghten test. The proposed American
Law Institute test, used by judge Wilke in the Esser case, probably
fits into this category. Although this test does have some merit in terms
of clarity, it seems to add little to the standard that is created by proper
instructions under the M'Naghten test. In Oborn v. State Wisconsin
clearly rejected this test of insanity.
This court is not committed to the doctrine that one can successfully claim immunity from punishment for his wrongful
act, consciously committed with consciousness of its wrongful
character, upon the ground that, through an abnormal mental
condition he did the act under an uncontrollable impulse rendering him insane. 1°
Bound up in this rejection of the irresistable impulse test is the idea
that if one has knowledge of right and wrong and the nature and
quality of his act he also has the capacity to make the correct choice
of not performing the act. This appears to be a proper evaluation, and
thus, the addition of this modification to M'Naghten is, practically
speaking, unnecessary.
The second basic criticism of the M'Naghten test is one coming
from some psychiatrists-the expert witnesses at insanity trials. Their
criticism is directed against the limitation they feel the M'Naghten
test puts upon the testimony they may present. This criticism is
typified by such references as the one made by Dr. Guttmacher to
the .'M'Naghten straight jacket."1 Their complaint is, basically,
that under M'Naghten they are not allowed to present their testimony
in the fullest light in view of recent advancements in the field of
psychiatry. It was this criticism that led to formulation of the Durham
test which used the New Hampshire case of State v. Pike12 for a
model in establishing a test excusing criminal responsibility if the act
was the product of a mental disease or defect.13 As is apparent, this
test certainly does expand the area of the opinion, and value to be
given it, of the expert witness. But this test does have two funda10 Supra note 6, at 272, 126 N.W. at 746.

11 Guttmacher, In-sanity and The Criminal Law--A Critique of Durham v. United
States, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 318 (1955).
1249 N.H. 399 (1869).
13214 F. 2d 862 (App. D.C. 1954).

19631

RECENT DECISIONS

mental weaknesses which make it an unworkable test. The first is that
it does not create any standard which a jury may use in determining
whether or not a man is legally insane. The second, which may be a
result of the first, is the danger that opinion of psychiatrists will be
substituted for an actual jury determination of the sanity question.
In Mc Donald v. U. S., 14 a case involving a plea of insanity in Washington D. C., the circuit court judges sitting en banc recognized these
fundamental weaknesses of the Durham test. In regard to the lack of
standard, they attempted to clarify what is meant by a product of a
mental disease or defect.
Our eight year experience -under Durham suggests a judicial
definition, however broad and general of what is included in
the terms "disease" and "defect." . . . Consequently for that
purpose the jury should be told that a mental disease or defect
includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially
impairs behavior controls. 5
In regard to the danger of the experts' opinion being substituted for
the actual jury determination of the question of sanity, the court
stated in the same case:
We emphasize that, since tlie question whether the defendant
has a disease or defect is ultimately for triers of fact, obviously
its resolution cannot be controlled by expert opinion. The jury
must determine for itself, from all the testimony, lay and expert,
whether the nature and degree of the disability are sufficient
to establish a mental disease or defect as we now have defined
those terms. 6
It is interesting to note that after eight years the courts of Washington D. C. have finally realized the defects of the Durham test. But
it appears that Mc Donald v. U. S. is little more than a recognition
of these defects, and that if the Durham test is to be used as a workable test of insanity a satisfactory solution to its defects has yet to
come. The jury is still left without a standard. De facto, what constitutes a disease or defect is still something that will be decided by
the expert witness under this test. A jury, left with ". . . any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
process and substantially impairs behavior controls . . ." must rely on
psychiatrists to define such disease, defect, and impairment of control. Ultimately these definitions, and not a jury finding, will be determinant in the finding of insanity. In view of these defects it may be
concluded that under our present legal system the Durham test of
14 312 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'1

Id. at 850.

16 Id. at 851.
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insanity is not a workable one because it is not primarily geared to
a jury system.
It is the above criticisms of the three basic tests that have made
attempts to reach a definition of what legal insanity is one of the
most perplexing problems faced by jurists today. This perplexity is
spread across the country, and dissatisfaction with the traditional tests
is typified by recent Wisconsin decisions. Dissatisfaction with the
strict right-wrong test first appeared in State v. Carlson where it was
stated: "Some members of the court are of the opinion that this rule
should be modified so that a defendant is to be found insane if an
abnormal condition of the mind renders him incapable of conforming
his conduct to that which he deems right. '17 This suggests an irresistable impulse modification, but since the issue was not raised on trial,
the court chose not to pass on this contention. This dissatisfaction
was further brought out by the strong dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Hallows in Kowsek v. State.' In his dissent, Justice Hallows
presented several arguments for adoption of the proposed test of the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. The dissatisfaction
was clearly brought forth in the Esser case when the court adopted a
new wording for the test of insanity in Wisconsin.
The term "insanity" in the law means such abnormal condition of the mind, from any cause, as to render the defendant
incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the alleged
wrongful act, or incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong with respect to such act.19
It is true that this is still basically a right-wrong test, but it clearly
indicates the fermentation in this area of the law. Mr. Justice Hallows,
dissenting in part, again urged adoption of the American Law Institute
test. Mr. Justice Dieterich, dissenting in part, urged adoption of the
M'Naghten rule with the addition of an irresistable impulse clause.
This modification of the test, in Esser, along with the close division
of the court, can only allow one to speculate on what will develop in
the future as far as what the legal definition of insanity will be in
Wisconsin.
The test that is ultimately adopted should be based on certain
fundamental considerations. Primarily it must be borne in mind that
man is a rational creature, thus, the knowledge requirement of the
M'Naghten test should be maintained in some form. At the same
time it must be remembered that man is possessed of a free-will, and
is able to chose between doing or not doing a particular act. Thus,
the definition should be framed so testimony is given both in regard
175

Wis.2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 655 (1958).

18 8 Wis.2d 640, 100 N.W.2d 339 (1960).

19 Supra note 1, at 567, 115 N.W. 2d at 505.
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to the cognitive and volitional aspects of man's nature. There is a very
important distinction to be made in this area. Namely, the fact that as
far as the jury standard is concerned it is not the clear cut cases of
sanity or insanity that present the problem of definition. Rather it is
the border line cases that need a properly clarified standard in order
to be correctly decided. It is in these close areas that a strict M'Naghten
test stressing cognition may be defective unless supplemented with
proper instruction.
Normally, a man will not do an act which he considers to be
against his basic nature. However, if a man's cognitive power is
impaired, he may do an act against his nature because he does not
know it to be such. Also, a man may know an act is wrong and still
do it because his evaluation of that act is that it is right for him to
do it here and now.
A man may be suffering from a mental disease and still have
sufficient control through knowing decision to be criminally
responsible. However, as noted, the degree of control may be
so reduced
that the accused is no longer accountable for his
20
action.
A proper test of insanity must include a determination of the stage
at which a deranged functioning of this evalulative aspect of man's
nature is to be a basis for finding no criminal responsibility. It seems
that until now this important distinction has been either over-looked
or de-emphasized at the expense of stressing the knowledge aspect
of the right-wrong test.
Finally it should be remembered that the determination of the
sanity question ultimately lies in the hands of the jury. This jury is
composed of laymen, and thus, the standard must be such that it is
understandable to them.
The above listed points are the ones that must be borne in mind in
formulating a workable and practical definition of insanity. Under
proper interpretation, the standard created by the Esser case or the
American Law Institute test could be so established to meet these
requirements. But in all probability neither of these will be retained
in unchanged form. A typical example of the type of replacements
that will be proposed is the test set out by Professor Hall in an article
in the Yale Law Journal.
A crime is not committed by anyone who, because of a mental
disease is unable to understand what he is doing and to control
his conduct at the time he commits a harm forbidden by criminal
law. In deciding this question with reference to the criminal conduct with which a defendant is charged, the trier of facts should
decide (1) whether, because of mental disease, the defendant
19 DAViTT, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, 210 (1959).
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lacked the capacity to understand the physical nature and consequences of his conduct: and (2) whether, because of such disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to realize that it was
morally wrong to commit the harm in question.2
This test, like the American Law Institute test, is much like the
M'Naghten test, but meets the criticism of not bearing on control of
a man's conduct, that is often directed at the latter.
The test laid out by the Wisconsin Court in the Esser case, when
properly interpretated, is geared to accomplishing the same thing. As
such, it is typical of the developments in this area of the law. Further
developments are sure to take place along the same line, and due to
the perplexity of the problems in the area, one can do no more than
wait and see what course they will follow.
DAVID A.

SUEMNICK

Negligence: The Sleeping Driver's Negligence as a Matter of
Law-The defendant Louis Shepherd, having participated in the senior
class play, attended a party at the home of one of the members of the
cast. There was some liquor served at the party, but there was no
evidence that anyone became intoxicated. About 3:00 A.M. the party
broke up and five girls, including the plaintiff, got into Shepherd's
car for the ride home. About four miles from the party the car left
the road, hit a tree, and the plaintiff was injured.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, apportioning 95% of the
negligence to defendant. The defendant appealed the decision on the
theory that he had fallen asleep without warning and that he was not
liable for his actions while asleep. The supreme court held that falling
asleep while driving is negligence as a matter of law.'
In reaching this decision the court reasoned that falling asleep is
attended by premonitory warnings or is to be expected from prior
activities and experience. "We ... hold that falling asleep at the wheel

is negligence as a matter of law because no facts can exist which will
2
justify, excuse or exculpate such negligence."
Prior to this decision Wisconsin had adopted the majority view
that was first enunciated by the supreme court of Connecticut in
Bushnell v. Bushnell, where it was stated:

(T)he mere fact of his going to sleep while driving is a
proper basis for an inference of negligence sufficient to make
out a prima facie case, and sufficient for a recovery, if no circumstances tending to excuse or justfy his conduct are proven.
J. 761, 781 (1956).
Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mutual Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W. 2d 140
(1962).
2 Id. at 98, 118 N.W. 2d at 144.
3 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).

21 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.
I

